every reference i've read about midway has mentioned civilian workers still on
yorktown when she hit the waves to the battle. i've always wondered if they
suffered any injuries and if they earned any medals.
were they volunteers, or "drafted" into the job? i'm sure if offered a choice,
they would have jumped in, but, were they offered a choice? i wonder how many
there were and if they had their own post war reunions? the number seems to be
a bit flexible. i also wonder about what their special knowledge areas
included.
i've always marveled at that, kind of like the taxi drivers and the miracle on
the marne.
I just watched "Sinking of the Bismarck" on dvd. A fine flick. And
in this movie version, quite a few civilian workers were onboard the
HMS Hood and the Hood blew up early on with very few surviors. Other
parts of the internet seem to support this as the truth.
On 2 July, 21:15, snipped-for-privacy@blarf-fake-not-real.com (jj) wrote:
IIRC, the dockyard workers were on the then-new Prince of Wales,
finishing off some jobs - the main turrets were giving trouble, and
eventually failed.
The Captain of the PoW was played by an actor called Esmond Knight who
really had been on the bridge of the PoW during the action, and lost
his left eye when a 15" shell passed through (fortunately without
detonating). He was totally blind for a couple of years before
regaining some sight in his right eye and resuming his acting career.
If you ever catch the movie "Robin and Marian", he's the old guy
holding the castle at the start "with only half an eye" - that's not
prosthetics, that's really an empty eye socket...
Regards,
Moramarth
Whew, that must *really* have stretched his face LOL
PoW had loads of problems, indeed. But she gave a good account of
herself in the end, with that important hit in the bow puncturing a
bunker oil tank IIRC.
I think it is too bad she was not incredibly heavily damaged instead of
managing to exit the battle shortly afterward, it might have given the
Admiralty some thought about how good the protection on the KGV ships
really was.
:
: I think it is too bad she was not incredibly heavily damaged instead of
: managing to exit the battle shortly afterward, it might have given the
: Admiralty some thought about how good the protection on the KGV ships
: really was.
:
PoW really had to disengage the action when the flagship was
lost - not because the flagship was lost, but PoW could not
allow the Prinz Eugen to take potshots at her w/out any return
fire.
Clearly the most important opponent was Bismark, so there
really wasn't any option to split fire (and, wasn't PoW's jammed
turret X or Y? One of the rear turrets?)
I think the real tragedy was that the Admiralty did not,
apparently, learn anything from the Bismark/Tarantano incident,
and decided to send "Force X" to Malaysia w/out the cover of the
carrier (Hermes?) once she went aground around Jamica.
This decision was furthur exacerbated by the Admiral of
"Force X" not calling up aircover after they turned back to
Malaysia, having not found any landing forces in the area.
Granted, they were only Buffalo's, but still...
Bruce
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX.
On 4 July, 04:00, snipped-for-privacy@realtime.net (Bruce Burden) wrote:
Actually, it was pretty good. Maybe not one of the best schemes of
the era, but well executed. IIRC, the quality of British and German
plate was on par, both slightly superior to US armour, which in turn
was of much better quality than Japanese, which wasn't put together
that well either. Thickness isn't everything. PoW problems were she
was finished in a hurry, and nothing really worked right. Again IIRC,
one of the reasons for her loss was that the electrics went out en
masse, rather than individual systems being protected. The first
torpedo hit bent a prop shaft which kept turning and tore a big hole
right into the machinery spaces, a lot of the dynamos went straight
away, which took out the pumps and the main 5.25" AA battery. She
still stayed afloat longer than the older Repulse which was hit later,
and the majority of her crew were saved - her watertight integrity may
have been compromised in order to evacuate them.
Only one turret at the back, but I think both Quintuples were a
problem - the civilian workers were from Vickers Armstrong, not
Cammell Laird, who built the ship. The KGVs were originally intended
to have three quintuple 14" turrets for a 12 gun broadside, but "B"
was reduced to a twin to save weight for protection. British
machinery hadn't evolved as far as US equivalents and took up a
greater proportion of displacement, leaving less weight for armament
and protection, but was rugged, reliable, and usually capable of
finding a little bit extra when needed (e.g. HMAS Sydney running down
the theoretically much faster Giovanni della Banda Nere, or HMS
Cumberland's transit from the Falklands to the River Plate to support
Harewood's squadron - I think that remains the record for a sustained
high speed run; I don't doubt the modern US CVNs couldn't beat it, but
they won't go anywhere without their escort group, who collectively
can't)
Indomitable, IIRC. Probably a bit of luck, we'd just have lost a new
carrier as well, although even Fulmars would have been effective
against the aircraft attacking "Force Z". "Hermes" was lost some
months later.
Yes, Tom Phillips was a "Big Gun" Admiral, although lack of
appreciation of air cover wasn't that uncommon at that period - c.f.
the actions of the Captain of the Glorious at an earlier date. But
the RN has always (rightly) got on with the job with the resources to
hand, and taken the knocks - the evacuation of Crete being one
example. ISTR PoW's Captain, John Leach, was less blasé about their
chances, going by an account of their last meeting shortly before
"Force Z" sailed, given by his son on TV once. Fortunately, the son
also continued to believe the job should be done, regardless of
adequate air power. In 1982 the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, was
instrumental in convincing Margaret Thatcher a Task Force should be
sent to the Falklands, even if it could only be defended by a handful
of Sea Harriers...
:
: and protection, but was rugged, reliable, and usually capable of
: finding a little bit extra when needed (e.g. HMAS Sydney running down
: the theoretically much faster Giovanni della Banda Nere,
:
Was Sydney designed/built specifically for the Ausies? Reason
I am asking is the Dutch designed much of their East Indies fleet
with an eye to specific conditions for the Western/South Pacific,
namely, much larger heat exchangers, to cope with the comparatively
warmer waters of the Pacific vs the N. Atlantic.
:
: Indomitable, IIRC. Probably a bit of luck, we'd just have lost a new
: carrier as well, although even Fulmars would have been effective
: against the aircraft attacking "Force Z".
:
My main problem was that "Force Z" (sorry) was supposed to be
a disincentive for the Japanese. From the point of view, it was a
complete failire, due to the British government (Churchill) failing
to learn and apply the lessons of Tarantano and the Bismark. I can't
criticise the Admiralty for following the orders of their overlords.
:
: ISTR PoW's Captain, John Leach, was less blase about their
: chances, going by an account of their last meeting shortly before
: "Force Z" sailed, given by his son on TV once.
:
Was Leach also the Capitan during the action with the Bismack?
I recall that the PoW was made something of a pariah by the common
sailors of the RN, although with the discovery of the wreckage of
the Hood, it was clear that everything had been done correctly in
that engagement, and Hood just had the damnable luck to be hit when
she was.
:
: adequate air power. In 1982 the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, was
: instrumental in convincing Margaret Thatcher a Task Force should be
: sent to the Falklands, even if it could only be defended by a handful
: of Sea Harriers...
:
While I understand what you are saying, I am not sure that
it is the same thing. The Argentines did not have any loiter time
around the islands, which was a far cry from Force Z and all of
the Japanese land based airpower available. But, I will have to
allow that Western powers may well have been ignorant of that fact,
given the pretty ugly stereotyping that was common at the time.
Clearly, the Gallahad(?) incident and a couple of others tell
us that _any_ opportunity can be enough, unfortunately.
Speaking of which, didn't I read something about the Argentina
making noises about the Malvinas once again?
Bruce
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"I like bad!" Bruce Burden Austin, TX.
On 5 July, 04:07, snipped-for-privacy@realtime.net (Bruce Burden) wrote:
Oops, my bad: it was the Bartolomeo Colleoni that was sunk, Bande Nere
escaped...
Although the three Australian ships were a modification of the
"Leander" Class, AFAIK the modifications weren't specifically for that
duty, merely a rearrangemrnt of boiler and machinery spaces to make
them less vulnerable to damage. Indeed, the first two (HMASs Perth
and Hobart) were originally HMSs Amphion ans Apollo, with only Sydney
recieving her Australian name before commisioning (she was to have
been HMS Phaeton). The redesigned hull was scaled down for the
Arethusa class, which in turn was used as a basis for the Didos.
IIRC, the Admiralty argued long and hard against "Force Z" being
deployed, but Churchill was intrangisent. Politically, he had to take
account of colonial sensibilities, primarily those of the Australians,
but he does seem to have had a lifelond misunderstanding of the
realities of naval (and amphibious) warfare...
Yes, due to her short life she only had one captain. Leach was one of
only three survivors (of 16) of the hit on the compass platform, and
the only one not seriously injured. I was wrong in that the 15" brick
did explode, but only after passing through - it would have been fused
to detonate inside armour.
Not just the common sailors, Dudly Pound wanted to court-martial Leach
(and Wake-Walker) for breaking off the action, but John Tovey
threatened to resign and appear for the defence if this happened.
although with the discovery of the wreckage of
That wasn't certain when the Task Force sailed: it was expected there
would be airpower operating from Port Stanley Airport (hence the
"Black Buck" missions), and also "25 de Mayo"s air group (A4s, even if
the Super Entendards weren't ready) to worry about. It took a certain
amount of character for Sir Henry to be such a forceful advocate for
the sending of the Task force considering how his father's fate must
have weighed on him.
which was a far cry from Force Z and all of
Phillips certainly was of the opinion Japanese forces weren't up to
much, and no-one had any idea of the superiority of the aircraft the
Japanese were then deploying. However, of the around 90 aircraft
attacking "Force Z", nearly half were high-level bombers which were
pretty much ineffective, but the torpedo bombers hit with 6 or 8 of
the nearly 50 expended. Repulse dodged 19 torpedos before she was
caught between two groups attacking from different directions, while
even PoW only collected three more after the first crippling hit.
True, but it's interesting that apart from "Sheffield" and "Atlantic
Conveyor", all the other sinkings were of ships close inshore and
under direct observation by Argentine ground forces (delayed action in
the case of Antelope).
I wouldn't be surprised, I understand the current President is having
domestic problems...
Interestingly, I know when Shinano was sunk by the US submarine, a lot
of the casualties were Japanese and Korean dockyard workers, with a
scattering of IJN personnel. Don't know if there were any other losses
with this casualty mix, say since WWII.
Usually ships aren't moved that far for a refit and further build. The
war was pretty much lost at this point by the Japanese but it would
have been interesting to posit how a loss of specialized trades early
in a conflict would have hurt one side in a conflict.
Modern time observation, but I know my cousin that was stationed on USS
Constellation during the 80s mentioned that there were always civilians
on the ship - factory reps, technical advisers, and such - while he was
afloat.
I got another friend at work who says he's been on the boat during
peacetime and during wartime (Gulf War 1) and there's no diff.
I know that post WWII the relationship between civilian industry and the
USN grew much tighter - the advent of the nuc-Navy may have been
somewhat responsible for that, I dunno - or what previuos operational
policy may have been. But I have observed that Civvies working
alongside uniformed Navy personnel is pretty common at most/all times.
Other branches may vary.
i bet the sub safe program really got the two sides together and really made a
difference in quality. too bad the reasons for it were very expensive in
lives.
..."unfortunately, most safety procedures are written in blood"...that's
what the skipper had to say after we lost one of our officers in a SAR
training accident. Helo blade struck the side of a cliff and came
through the cabin and took the guy out - also lost one of the enlisted crew.
Now they train different. But I still had to stand under a missing-man
flyover...for a guy I knew and worked beside for about three years. And
I also (and still) know the mishap pilot. He wanted to turn in his
wings then and there, but the guys wouldn't let him. He eventually went
Civvie, but still flies I think.
some people can understand the act-of-god thing in accidents and some have to
eat all the grief. no one wins but some survive.
sounds kind of cold but that's the way it is.
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