civilian workers on yorktown at midway.

some people can understand the act-of-god thing in accidents and some have to eat all the grief. no one wins but some survive. sounds kind of cold but that's the way it is.

Whew, that must *really* have stretched his face LOL

PoW had loads of problems, indeed. But she gave a good account of herself in the end, with that important hit in the bow puncturing a bunker oil tank IIRC.

I think it is too bad she was not incredibly heavily damaged instead of managing to exit the battle shortly afterward, it might have given the Admiralty some thought about how good the protection on the KGV ships really was.

Good actor, I remember the movie.

Circumstances of this particular incident were a bit off procedure, but the element of chance involved was even stranger.

But yeah - you have to stand back sometimes...when I was out for a few days on USS Lincoln, we got a tour of a fire locker. The Chief explained to us that the first priority of the fire watch was/is to save the SHIP, and not to save people. That if a compartment was on fire or flooding and a hatch needed to be closed, they were to seal the people into the compartment if that's what it took to halt the fire. Because if the ship burned to the waterline, 5000+ people could die as opposed to the just the ones shut into the compartment...

...actually standing there and hearing something like that is REAL sobering, let me tell you. THAT, is a realty check if there ever is one.

Gernot Hassenpflug wrote: : : I think it is too bad she was not incredibly heavily damaged instead of : managing to exit the battle shortly afterward, it might have given the : Admiralty some thought about how good the protection on the KGV ships : really was. : PoW really had to disengage the action when the flagship was lost - not because the flagship was lost, but PoW could not allow the Prinz Eugen to take potshots at her w/out any return fire.

Clearly the most important opponent was Bismark, so there really wasn't any option to split fire (and, wasn't PoW's jammed turret X or Y? One of the rear turrets?)

I think the real tragedy was that the Admiralty did not, apparently, learn anything from the Bismark/Tarantano incident, and decided to send "Force X" to Malaysia w/out the cover of the carrier (Hermes?) once she went aground around Jamica.

This decision was furthur exacerbated by the Admiral of "Force X" not calling up aircover after they turned back to Malaysia, having not found any landing forces in the area. Granted, they were only Buffalo's, but still...

Bruce

Actually, it was pretty good. Maybe not one of the best schemes of the era, but well executed. IIRC, the quality of British and German plate was on par, both slightly superior to US armour, which in turn was of much better quality than Japanese, which wasn't put together that well either. Thickness isn't everything. PoW problems were she was finished in a hurry, and nothing really worked right. Again IIRC, one of the reasons for her loss was that the electrics went out en masse, rather than individual systems being protected. The first torpedo hit bent a prop shaft which kept turning and tore a big hole right into the machinery spaces, a lot of the dynamos went straight away, which took out the pumps and the main 5.25" AA battery. She still stayed afloat longer than the older Repulse which was hit later, and the majority of her crew were saved - her watertight integrity may have been compromised in order to evacuate them.

Only one turret at the back, but I think both Quintuples were a problem - the civilian workers were from Vickers Armstrong, not Cammell Laird, who built the ship. The KGVs were originally intended to have three quintuple 14" turrets for a 12 gun broadside, but "B" was reduced to a twin to save weight for protection. British machinery hadn't evolved as far as US equivalents and took up a greater proportion of displacement, leaving less weight for armament and protection, but was rugged, reliable, and usually capable of finding a little bit extra when needed (e.g. HMAS Sydney running down the theoretically much faster Giovanni della Banda Nere, or HMS Cumberland's transit from the Falklands to the River Plate to support Harewood's squadron - I think that remains the record for a sustained high speed run; I don't doubt the modern US CVNs couldn't beat it, but they won't go anywhere without their escort group, who collectively can't)

Indomitable, IIRC. Probably a bit of luck, we'd just have lost a new carrier as well, although even Fulmars would have been effective against the aircraft attacking "Force Z". "Hermes" was lost some months later.

Yes, Tom Phillips was a "Big Gun" Admiral, although lack of appreciation of air cover wasn't that uncommon at that period - c.f. the actions of the Captain of the Glorious at an earlier date. But the RN has always (rightly) got on with the job with the resources to hand, and taken the knocks - the evacuation of Crete being one example. ISTR PoW's Captain, John Leach, was less blas=E9 about their chances, going by an account of their last meeting shortly before "Force Z" sailed, given by his son on TV once. Fortunately, the son also continued to believe the job should be done, regardless of adequate air power. In 1982 the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, was instrumental in convincing Margaret Thatcher a Task Force should be sent to the Falklands, even if it could only be defended by a handful of Sea Harriers...

Regards,

Moramarth

Moramarth wrote: : : and protection, but was rugged, reliable, and usually capable of : finding a little bit extra when needed (e.g. HMAS Sydney running down : the theoretically much faster Giovanni della Banda Nere, : Was Sydney designed/built specifically for the Ausies? Reason I am asking is the Dutch designed much of their East Indies fleet with an eye to specific conditions for the Western/South Pacific, namely, much larger heat exchangers, to cope with the comparatively warmer waters of the Pacific vs the N. Atlantic. : : Indomitable, IIRC. Probably a bit of luck, we'd just have lost a new : carrier as well, although even Fulmars would have been effective : against the aircraft attacking "Force Z". : My main problem was that "Force Z" (sorry) was supposed to be a disincentive for the Japanese. From the point of view, it was a complete failire, due to the British government (Churchill) failing to learn and apply the lessons of Tarantano and the Bismark. I can't criticise the Admiralty for following the orders of their overlords. : : ISTR PoW's Captain, John Leach, was less blase about their : chances, going by an account of their last meeting shortly before : "Force Z" sailed, given by his son on TV once. : Was Leach also the Capitan during the action with the Bismack? I recall that the PoW was made something of a pariah by the common sailors of the RN, although with the discovery of the wreckage of the Hood, it was clear that everything had been done correctly in that engagement, and Hood just had the damnable luck to be hit when she was. : : adequate air power. In 1982 the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, was : instrumental in convincing Margaret Thatcher a Task Force should be : sent to the Falklands, even if it could only be defended by a handful : of Sea Harriers... : While I understand what you are saying, I am not sure that it is the same thing. The Argentines did not have any loiter time around the islands, which was a far cry from Force Z and all of the Japanese land based airpower available. But, I will have to allow that Western powers may well have been ignorant of that fact, given the pretty ugly stereotyping that was common at the time.

Clearly, the Gallahad(?) incident and a couple of others tell us that _any_ opportunity can be enough, unfortunately.

Speaking of which, didn't I read something about the Argentina making noises about the Malvinas once again?

Bruce

Oops, my bad: it was the Bartolomeo Colleoni that was sunk, Bande Nere escaped...

Although the three Australian ships were a modification of the "Leander" Class, AFAIK the modifications weren't specifically for that duty, merely a rearrangemrnt of boiler and machinery spaces to make them less vulnerable to damage. Indeed, the first two (HMASs Perth and Hobart) were originally HMSs Amphion ans Apollo, with only Sydney recieving her Australian name before commisioning (she was to have been HMS Phaeton). The redesigned hull was scaled down for the Arethusa class, which in turn was used as a basis for the Didos.

IIRC, the Admiralty argued long and hard against "Force Z" being deployed, but Churchill was intrangisent. Politically, he had to take account of colonial sensibilities, primarily those of the Australians, but he does seem to have had a lifelond misunderstanding of the realities of naval (and amphibious) warfare...

Yes, due to her short life she only had one captain. Leach was one of only three survivors (of 16) of the hit on the compass platform, and the only one not seriously injured. I was wrong in that the 15" brick did explode, but only after passing through - it would have been fused to detonate inside armour.

Not just the common sailors, Dudly Pound wanted to court-martial Leach (and Wake-Walker) for breaking off the action, but John Tovey threatened to resign and appear for the defence if this happened. although with the discovery of the wreckage of

That wasn't certain when the Task Force sailed: it was expected there would be airpower operating from Port Stanley Airport (hence the "Black Buck" missions), and also "25 de Mayo"s air group (A4s, even if the Super Entendards weren't ready) to worry about. It took a certain amount of character for Sir Henry to be such a forceful advocate for the sending of the Task force considering how his father's fate must have weighed on him. which was a far cry from Force Z and all of

Phillips certainly was of the opinion Japanese forces weren't up to much, and no-one had any idea of the superiority of the aircraft the Japanese were then deploying. However, of the around 90 aircraft attacking "Force Z", nearly half were high-level bombers which were pretty much ineffective, but the torpedo bombers hit with 6 or 8 of the nearly 50 expended. Repulse dodged 19 torpedos before she was caught between two groups attacking from different directions, while even PoW only collected three more after the first crippling hit.

True, but it's interesting that apart from "Sheffield" and "Atlantic Conveyor", all the other sinkings were of ships close inshore and under direct observation by Argentine ground forces (delayed action in the case of Antelope).

I wouldn't be surprised, I understand the current President is having domestic problems...

Regards,

Interestingly, I know when Shinano was sunk by the US submarine, a lot of the casualties were Japanese and Korean dockyard workers, with a scattering of IJN personnel. Don't know if there were any other losses with this casualty mix, say since WWII.

Usually ships aren't moved that far for a refit and further build. The war was pretty much lost at this point by the Japanese but it would have been interesting to posit how a loss of specialized trades early in a conflict would have hurt one side in a conflict.

could have been a major effect.