VX-4 phantom loads

"Cold-soaking" was a big problem in the Sparrow at the time.

only one. I've

O/Bs, 2 CBUs

34th TFS birds

the serials it

69-7261) and

half of 1972.

IIRR he thought

strip lights, but

a/c lack them,

remember if

Okay, thanks. After try [ big snip ]

I'm not absolutely certain, but I seem to recall that F-4E 69-7551's arrival at Korat early in 1971 marked the first time I saw the EL panels. (It was eerily "ghostlike" taxiing at night...) That same aircraft (fresh from the factory) also boasted the first extended gun fairing I had seen. It was the only one on base with it.

----------------------------------------------

The above would agree with the information I have that 69-7261, the first Block

44 a/c, was the first a/c to be factory fit with the long blast fairing. 69-7551 was also from Block 44, which totaled 64 a/c. Possibly the EL strips came in at the same time in the factory as the blast fairing, with the rest of the a/c retrofitted with them and the blast fairing as they rotated through IRAN.

I've always thought 0498's load in that photo was somewhat odd; if the Mk.84s had had fuse extenders I would have guessed it was for an LZ prep, but these Mk.84s appear to have the standard Mk. 904 nose fuses. The only other mission that occurs to me would be road interdiction on the HCM trail; You clearly wouldn't plan to drop Mk.84s and the CBUs in the same pass, so presumably the 84s would be used to crater the road or bury it in a landslide, while the CBUs would be dropped on trucks or any likely patch of trees, or else used to mine it. I can't for the life of me imagine what other use would be made of that combo in the same sortie.

How early on did you fly it? Perhaps it was shot down or severely damaged before you could fly it again?

Coe says he

Webb called a

overshoot over

You may be right. Coe says they were cruising at 450 knots @ 20kft with the strike flight at

350-400, and the escorts were weaving to stay with the strike. If those speeds are KIAS or KCAS, the escorts would be cruising at something upwards of .9. Those speeds seem kind of low to me to be TAS for F-4s, even fully loaded.

Anyway, after one of the strikers called MiGs and broke, he says he jettisoned his tanks and went burner, while beginning a descending turn. He says he made about two turns, ending up at about 15kft with the strike flight out in front of him (they'd been turning too), when he saw a pair of 21s out in front and above at about 20kft. He'd loosened up the turns as no Migs had appeared immediately, so would have gained considerable speed, although perhaps not to1.6, which does seem a bit fast for 15kft. What do you think -- could he have gotten that fast relatively clean, in a diving, non-windup turn? I don't have a -1-1 for the F-4, so can't do a ballpark estimate of the accel.

have deception

jamming barrage,

perform any two of

Song of range,

sustainer section of

threat frequency

Use of, yes, but mandated carriage of, no. 7th AF required pod carriage by all a/c going into NVN, even the Weasels, despite their protests that this limited them to a single Shrike and they were rarely turned on in any case, as the jammers interfered with reception by the Weasel gear. I've got shots of 105Fs carrying single ALQ-101s in '68 or so. The dual Shrike launcher also seems to have been developed in response to this silly mandate, but the pilots disliked the vibration and drag.

The order for Weasels to carry a pod led to the requirement for an internal jammer for the 105F to recover a weapon station, which became the ALQ-105 scab mount on the 105G, essentially an ALQ-101 split in half lengthwise. They still rarely turned it on, but could once again carry Shrikes on both O/Bs.

Guy

before you could fly

Luck of the draw then, I guess.

strike flight at

speeds are KIAS or

seem kind of low

In that case, 350-400 KIAS for the strikers would be about right. At 20 kft ISA

350 KCAS works out to 480 kt., or 465 kt. after taking compressibility error into account. Given the typical hotter than ISA conditions, 350KCAS (which I think is what the ASI actually gave you in the F-4) @ 20kft. would be right around 480 kt.

Wouldn't they want some extra E over corner, because they'd be bound to piss it off quickly with any hard maneuvering?

jettisoned his tanks and

turns, ending up at

too), when he saw a

turns as no Migs had

perhaps not to1.6, which

that fast relatively

can't do a ballpark

Okay, although since he was rear aspect on the MiGs who seem to have been doing their usual supersonic (or at least, high transonic) missile pass and blow through, being well above transonic would seem to be necessary if he was going to catch them. It would certainly give his AIM-7 a better chance of overhauling them. Do you ever see him at Rats reunions? If so, maybe you could ask him about it.

all a/c going into

single Shrike and they

by the Weasel gear.

Shrike launcher also

pilots disliked the

jammer for the 105F

essentially an

once again carry

No argument there. I still don't know how I easily managed to find shots of two different 34th TFS a/c (as well as one from the 421st) carrying two pods in that era, if it was as unusual as you state. Just one more minor mystery that's unlikely to be solved.

I think we're talking past each other here. My point was that the higher commanders/people who wrote the requirement for the ALQ-101 very likely* did so for exactly the reasons Jenkins claimed, i.e. to provide better protection for a/c that weren't able to benefit from mutual jamming. Subsequent priority deployment of the ALQ-101 to those a/c tasked with such detached missions, i.e. Iron Hand/MiGCAP/Recon, indicates that Jenkins' comments about the perceived need for the development of the 101, _regardless of whether it was actually turned on by the crews_, is correct.

*I say "very likely" because I don't have Jenkins here, and don't know what his sources were for this statement, if he gave them.

Offhand, I don't recall seeing photos of a/c other than F-105WW or MiGCAPs carrying ALQ-101s from

1968-1973, although it may have happened. But even if there are some shots of same, the vast majority of photos I have of strikers/chaffers/escorts during LB I/II show them carrying pure noise jamming pods, and not ALQ-101s. I don't think I have a single photo of a 388th F-4E carrying an ALQ-101 during the bombing halt and LB periods. I know that the 388th had them when they were still equipped with Thuds, because there's a photo in Larry Davis' "Wild Weasel", taken at Korat, of a whole rack of ALQ-101s waiting to be loaded on a/c, with Thud tails visible above the revetments in the background. Presumably there were only limited numbers of -101s available in the theater, so if those pods weren't at the 388th in 1972 they must have been somewhere else. From photo evidence it appears that "somewhere else" was the 432nd at Udorn, the unit tasked with MiGCAP and Recon over the north, which is right in line with the intended deployment of the -101 described by Jenkins (the F-105Gs had their own " -101s" by this time, the ALQ-105).

Along that line, I could only find a single shot of a 67th TFS F-4CWW carrying a pod, and it's an

-87. The sample size is way too small to reach any definite conclusions, but I'd guess that there may not have been enough 101s to go around. The 67th was apparently tasked to do a lot of pre-emptive Shrike firings, which would have kept them out of the worst threats. Alternatively, Davis has illustrations showing them carrying ALQ-119s, which may have been just entering service at the time. The F-4Cs at Spangdahlem carried -119s a few years later, but I don't know when they became available.

Guy

it off quickly with any

In that case, his claim of maintaining 450 while weaving is at least possible.

doing their usual

well above transonic

give his AIM-7 a better

maybe you could ask him

two different 34th TFS

as unusual as you state.

No, thea/c in question was at Takhli, after the 421st moved from Danang (and the

366th was closed down). My point was that dual pod carriage was not limited to the 388th; I've got photos of 421st, 388th, and 432nd a/c so equipped, i.e. those from 3 different bases, all with escort or MiGCAP tasking.

Sure.

commanders/people who wrote

Jenkins claimed, i.e. to

jamming. Subsequent

missions, i.e. Iron

for the development of

his sources were for this

carrying ALQ-101s from

of same, the vast

them carrying pure noise

388th F-4E carrying an

Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the (V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of

388th F-4Es I have are in the Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

taken at Korat, of a

above the revetments in

Yes, which is probably why there are so few photos showing them being carried by Thuds (or any other a/c).

Uh Huh.

I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

From photo evidence it

MiGCAP and Recon over the

described by Jenkins (the

carrying a pod, and it's an

I'd guess that there

do a lot of pre-emptive

Alternatively, Davis has

entering service at the time.

when they became

Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj. William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972, accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and

0/165 in the same period. IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

Guy

Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available at

.

Regards,

Tex Houston

Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4 (or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real clusterfuck by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.

Guy

versions starting with the

I've got a shot of a 4th

It's got the strip lights

angle is wrong. Oddly, the

388th F-4Es I have are in the

The original one wasn't; it was the (V)-3 et. seq. that were the size you describe.

It does, with photos from first arrival at Korat up through1972, as well as shots of other units over the years. But there are more of the 388th in that era than any other unit or time.

I'll try and find a copy.

carrying what appears to be an

from the left wing so it

the jammers turned off (ISTR

with a pair of -87s in

and rely on terrain masking to

that coming in under the radar

the target and on the way out.

That's when they were most vulnerable, all right. They especially hated carrying Mk.84s, as they weren't available with Snakeye fins and the ballute was at most a gleam in the eye of the designers. So they had to pop to 2,500 feet or so for the delivery owing to the frag envelope, making them the sole attraction and star of the show.

'72 IIRR. Thornborough's F-111 book (the first, small one, not the later big one, although it's probably in there also) has the comments by some of the crews, including that particular one. He also talked to some of the '68 crews so I could be confusing things, but I think not.

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know; there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they apparently figured that one out.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.

IIRR they described their

statement from a contemporary

Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.

beginning in about April 1972,

fired, type of firing, and

Shrike launches were pre-emptive

0/165 in the same period.

started to use it.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the (revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

That's the definition.

No, your first definition was the correct one. Lofting them into an area where SAMs were known to be (or had been), to keep the Fan Songsoff the air.

Guy

Yeah, now that you mention it, I remember reading that.

Guy

practical impossibility; the NVN

North Vietnamese fired chaff to make

feet within seconds. Whether there

crews believed, I don't know;

a problem in '68, but they

Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library, so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near what it was for the typical Alpha Strike.

one? I think this info was in the

been in the Iron Hand book.

As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't ----------------------------------------------------------------

matheson Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options

That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73.

When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the system.

Les

-------------------------------------- Even more relevant was this one:

--------------------------------------

Robert W. King Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options

Hi Ed!

[stuff snipped]

In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight, yelled "SAM" and called for a break.

I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was ordered by the President in November 68.

(Bob was Major Robert J. Beck, Command Bar-Stooler and highly experienced Thud driver previously stationed at Spangdahlem AB. He was a sierra hotel dive bomber.)

It was a couple of months later when that happened. My memory says it was in Feb 1969 but I'm too lazy to dig out my log book. It was mid-morning. We were crusing at altitude southbound over Laos a few miles west of the west end of the DMZ. I had my head down in the cockpit updating the Doppler when from the corner of my eye, I saw the Shrike come off the outboard station. Being the Wild Weasel bear of our little crew and in charge of listening for enemy radar signals (There were none.) and being an all-around alert chap, I said "What the hell was that!" and then asked Bob what he was shooting at. He mumbled a bit and then said "We'll talk about it at the debrief." So I held my water until we got on the ground.

In the step-van on the way in from the flight line to debrief, I got the whole story. As you know, there aren't a lot of suitable locations to stash loose items such as checklists, maps and what-not in the cockpit of the Thud. Bob's solution for map storage when it was not in use was to stick it under his left thigh. In the course of stretching, he had shifted his weight on the seat and the map had slid off the seat to the left between the seat and left console. He tried picking it up with his left hand. He could only touch the edge of the map with his fingertips.

So in an effort to force his left hand a bit further into the narrow space between the seat and the console and recapture the map, he moved his right hand from its normal position on the stick and re-gripped it with his right wrist rotated so that the thumb was pointed down instead of up. In that unfamiliar configuration -- while fishing for a map near the cockpit floor with his left hand -- his right pinkie came in contact with the pickle button on the stick. The Shrike, ever obedient to its electrical signals, launched on a independent search and destroy mission over southern Laos.

It was astonishing how much attention we garnered after landing back at Takhli without that AGM-45 hanging on the outboard. With the bombing halt still in progress, the Weasels hadn't expended a Shrike in months. As Bob put it later that night at the bar, "I've been on this base nine months but I had to debrief guys I'd never seen or heard of before this afternoon."

-- Robert W. King I'm an ingenieur, NOT a bloody locomotive driver!

------------------------------------------------------

So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they started flying separate missions).

Guy