Test plan
During the daytime of April 25 1986, reactor 4 at [show location on an interactive map] 51°23?22.39?N, 30°05?56.93?E was scheduled to be shut down for maintenance. A decision was made to test the ability of the reactor's turbine generator to generate sufficient electricity to power the reactor's safety systems (in particular, the water pumps), in the event of a loss of external electric power. A RBMK-1000 reactor requires water to be continuously circulated through the core, as long as the nuclear fuel is present.
Chernobyl's reactors had a pair of backup diesel generators, but because there was a 40-second delay before they could attain full speed, the reactor was going to be used to spin up the reactor's turbine generator. Once at full speed, the turbine would be disconnected from the reactor and allowed to spin under its own rotational momentum. The aim of the test was to determine whether the turbines in the rundown phase could power the pumps while the generators were starting up. The test was previously successfully carried out on another unit (with all safety provisions active) with negative results ? the turbines did not generate sufficient power, but because additional improvements were made to reactor four's turbines, there was a need for another test.
Conditions prior to the accident
As conditions to run this test were prepared during the daytime of April
25, and the reactor electricity output had been gradually reduced to
50%, a regional power station unexpectedly went offline. The Kiev grid controller requested that the further reduction of output be postponed, as electricity was needed to satisfy the evening peak demand. The plant director agreed and postponed the test to comply. The ill-advised safety test was then left to be run by the night shift of the plant, a skeleton crew who would be working Reactor 4 that night and the early part of the next morning. This reactor crew had had little or no experience in nuclear power plants, many had been drafted in from coal powered plants and another had had a little experience with nuclear submarine power plants.[4]
At 11:00 p.m., April 25, the grid controller allowed the reactor shut-down to continue. The power output of reactor 4 was to be reduced from its nominal 3.2 GW thermal to 0.7?1.0 GW thermal in order to conduct the test at the prescribed lower level of power.[5] However, the new crew were unaware of the prior postponement of the reactor slowdown, and followed the original test protocol, which meant that the power level was decreased too rapidly. In this situation, the reactor produced more of the nuclear poison product xenon-135 (the xenon production rate:xenon loss rate ratio initially goes higher during a reactor power down), which dropped the power output to 30 MW thermal (approximately 5% of what was expected). The operators believed that the rapid fall in output was due to a malfunction in one of the automatic power regulators, not because of reactor poisoning. In order to increase the reactivity of the underpowered reactor (caused unknowingly by neutron absorption of excess xenon-135), automatic control rods were pulled out of the reactor beyond what is allowed under safety regulations.
Despite this breach, the reactor's power only increased to 200MW, still less than a third of the minimum required for the experiment. Despite this, the crew's management chose to continue the experiment. As part of the experiment, at 1:05 a.m. on April 26 the water pumps that were to be driven by the turbine generator were turned on; increasing the water flow beyond what is specified by safety regulations. The water flow increased at 1:19 a.m. ? since water also absorbs neutrons, this further increase in the water flow necessitated the removal of the manual control rods, producing a very precarious operating situation where coolant and xenon-135 was substituting some of the role of the control rods of the reactor.
Fatal experiment
At 1:23:04 the experiment began. The unstable state of the reactor was not reflected in any way on the control panel, and it did not appear that anyone in the reactor crew was fully aware of any danger. The steam to the turbines was shut off and, as the momentum of the turbine generator drove the water pumps, the water flow rate decreased, decreasing the absorption of neutrons by the coolant. The turbine was disconnected from the reactor, increasing the level of steam in the reactor core. As the coolant heated, pockets of steam formed voids in the coolant lines. Due to the RBMK reactor-type's large positive void coefficient, the steam bubbles increased the power of the reactor rapidly, and the reactor operation became progressively less stable and more dangerous. As the reaction continued, the excess xenon-135 was burnt up, increasing the number of neutrons available for fission. The prior removal of manual and automatic control rods had no substitute, leading to a runaway reaction.
At 1:23:40 the operators pressed the AZ-5 ("Rapid Emergency Defense 5") button that ordered a "SCRAM" ? a shutdown of the reactor, fully inserting all control rods, including the manual control rods that had been incautiously withdrawn earlier. It is unclear whether it was done as an emergency measure, or simply as a routine method of shutting down the reactor upon the completion of an experiment (the reactor was scheduled to be shut down for routine maintenance). It is usually suggested that the SCRAM was ordered as a response to the unexpected rapid power increase. On the other hand, Anatoly Dyatlov, deputy chief engineer at the nuclear station at the time of the accident, writes in his book:
Prior to 01:23:40, systems of centralized control ? didn't register any parameter changes that could justify the SCRAM. Commission ? gathered and analyzed large amount of materials and, as stated in its report, failed to determine the reason why the SCRAM was ordered. There was no need to look for the reason. The reactor was simply being shut down upon the completion of the experiment.[6]
The slow speed of the control rod insertion mechanism (18?20 seconds to complete), and the flawed rod design which initially reduces the amount of coolant present, meant that the SCRAM actually increased the reaction rate. At this point an energy spike occurred and some of the fuel rods began to fracture, placing fragments of the fuel rods in line with the control rod columns. The rods became stuck after being inserted only one-third of the way, and were therefore unable to stop the reaction. At this point nothing could be done to stop the disaster. By 1:23:47 the reactor jumped to around 30 GW, ten times the normal operational output. The fuel rods began to melt and the steam pressure rapidly increased, causing a large steam explosion. Generated steam traveled vertically along the rod channels in the reactor, displacing and destroying the reactor lid, rupturing the coolant tubes and then blowing a hole in the roof.[7] After part of the roof blew off, the inrush of oxygen, combined with the extremely high temperature of the reactor fuel and graphite moderator, sparked a graphite fire. This fire greatly contributed to the spread of radioactive material and the contamination of outlying areas.
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